House Prices and Health in Europe

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Work in Progress

SHARE Seminar November 17, 2014

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Motivation

- Does higher socioeconomic status (SES) lead to better health?
- Positive correlation between SES and health
- Gradient is "poorly understood" (A. Deaton)
- ▶ Shocks on SES :
- Macro shocks : fall of the Berlin Wall
- ▶ Micro shocks : lottery prizes, inheritances
- House prices shocks = exogenous variations in local house prices (Ratcliffe, 2013)
 - ► Housing represents a large share of household wealth. Booms and busts in house prices → significant gains and losses in wealth
 - House prices variations capture
 - Pure wealth effects
 - Changes in available amenities in the area
 - Changes in economic opportunities in the area
 - Separate analysis for homeowners and non-homeowners
 - Positive correlation between house prices and well-being, for both population groups → Wealth + amenities + opportunities effects

Motivation

- ▶ We explore whether house prices have an impact on health
 - for individuals ages 50 and older
 - in five European countries: France, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.
- Data
 - ► SHARE data, waves 2 (2006-2007) and 4 (2011-2012)
 - Longitudinal aspect
 - ▶ The 2006-2012 period : large variations in prices around the 2008 crisis
 - Subjective house prices
 - Large set of health variables: general health status, depression, physical health problems, and health-related behaviours
 - Data on objective house prices, disaggregated by regions, from various national sources
- ► Contributions :
 - Five European countries; international comparisons
 - ▶ Both subjective and objective house prices
 - ► (Increase and decrease in house prices)
 - Wide range of health components and behaviours



Outline

Motivation

Empirical Findings on Health and Wealth Shocks Other Than House Prices Shocks House Prices Shocks

Data

The SHARE Objective House Prices Variables

Empirical Strategy

Results

Objective and Subjective House Prices Effect of Objective House Prices on Health Effect of Subjective House Prices on Health

Conclusion



Empirical Findings on Health and Wealth - Shocks Other Than House Prices Shocks

- Frijters et al. (2005)
 - ► Health : SAH
 - Shock : fall of the Berlin wall
 - Small positive effect of income on health
- ► Meer et al. (2003)
 - Health: self-assessed health and a binary variable indicating physical or nervous disabilities which limit the individual's ability to work
 - Shock : inheritances
 - No effect of wealth on health
- Kim and Ruhm (2012)
 - Health: mortality rates, self-assessed health, ADL, IADL, depression, health behaviours (use of medical services)
 - Shock : inheritances
 - No effect for most outcomes; positive effect for alcohol consumption (and use of medical services)

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- Lindahl (2005)
 - Health: a general health measure comprised of both the physical and mental aspects of health
 - Shock : lottery prizes
 - Positive effect
- ► Gardner and Oswald (2007)
 - Health: mental health (GHQ)
 - Shock : lottery prizes
 - Positive effect
- ► Apouey and Clark (2014)
 - ► Health : general, physical, and mental health, lifestyles
 - Shock : lottery prizes
 - No effect on general health, positive effect on mental health, detrimental effect on lifestyles

- ▶ Van Kippersluis and Galama (2013)
 - Health: eating, smoking, and drinking behaviours
 - Shock : lottery prizes and inheritances
 - Detrimental impact on lifestyles
- ► Schwandt (2014)
 - Health: physical health, mental health, and survival rates
 - Shock : stock market fluctuations
 - Positive effects
- Conclusion
 - Heterogeneity of the types of shocks
 - Heterogeneity of the effects on health components

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
Empirical Findings on Health and Wealth - House Prices Shocks

- ► Ratcliffe (2013)
- ▶ Individual data from the BHPS between 1991 and 2007 matched with average house prices by postcode areas
- ► Health variable : mental health (GHQ)
- ▶ Increases in house prices = wealth effect + change in available amenities in the area + change in economic opportunities
- Homeowners / non-homeowners
- Positive correlation between house prices and well-being for both homeowner and non-homeowners
 - Inconsistent with a pure wealth effect
 - House prices also reflect amenities and opportunities

Data - The SHARE

- ► SHARE, waves 2 (2006-2007) and 4 (2011-2012)
- Individuals aged 50 and older from several European countries
- Nationally representative samples
- Longitudinal survey
- Individual- and household-level data on housing, health, and socioeconomic conditions
- ► Sample restrictions :
 - Individuals who are surveyed in both waves of SHARE
 - ▶ We want to take advantage of the longitudinal aspect of the data
 - France, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland
 - ▶ The disaggregated house price index is only available for these countries

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
 $\begin{array}{l} \mathbf{Figure}: \ \mathbf{Countries} \ \mathbf{Participating} \ \mathbf{in} \\ \mathbf{SHARE} \end{array}$

 $\mathbf{FIGURE}: \mathsf{Our}\;\mathsf{Sample}$


Data - Objective House Prices

- Quarterly house prices, disaggregated at the region level
- ► Smallest region identifier in the SHARE :
 - Spain and Sweden: NUTS3
 - France, the Netherlands, Switzerland : NUTS2
- ▶ The 2006-2012 period : rapid and contrasted evolutions of house prices
 - Plummeted in Spain after 2007
 - Continuously decreased in the Netherlands after 2008
 - ▶ Increased in France and Sweden
- We exploit within and between-country variation in the interview date at each wave

The Timing of the SHARE



Objective House Prices in Europe, 2005-2012



Objective House Prices Changes in our Sample

% change in house prices	Sweden	Netherlands	Spain	France	Switzerland	Total
<-15	0	0	18.00	0	0	4.45
-15 to -10	0	0	12.44	0	0	3.08
-10 to -5	0	6.33	30.63	0	0	9.09
-5 to 0	0	77.90	28.46	0	0	25.69
0 to 5	0	15.77	10.46	48.07	0	14.20
5 to 10	0	0	0	15.02	0	2.45
10 to 15	0	0	0	0	26.66	3.66
15 to 20	3.61	0	0	36.91	35.14	11.61
20 to 25	22.45	0	0	0	20.71	7.62
25 to 30	34.06	0	0	0	0	7.25
>30	39.87	0	0	0	17.49	10.89
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	913	1027	1061	699	589	4289

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Variables

Variables - General and Mental Health

- ► General health Self-assessed health (SAH)
 - "Would you say your health is... Excellent; Very good; Good; Fair; Poor?"
 - From 1 (poor) to 5 (excellent)
- ► Mental well-being
 - ▶ EURO-D index, constructed using answers on 12 questions on depression
 - Recoded so that 0 represents poor mental health (depression) and 12 good mental health (no depression)

Variables - Physical Health

- Physical health Mobility
 - ► From 0 (important mobility problems) to 10 (no mobility problem)
- Physical health Less health symptoms
 - Score on health symptoms varies between 0 and 12
 - Recoded so that 0 indicates poor health (12 health symptoms) and 12 good health (no health symptom)
- Physical health Less ADL and IADL
 - ► ADL = limitations with activities of daily living; between 0 and 6
 - ▶ IADL = limitations with instrumental activities of daily living; between 0 and 7
 - ▶ Recoded so thathigher values mean better health / less limitations
- Physical health Grip strength
 - Strength of individuals' hands in a gripping exercise: individuals are asked to squeeze a handle as hard as they can for a couple of seconds. Alternate measurements from the right and left hand
 - From 0 to 100



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Variables - Health-Related Behaviours/Lifestyles

- Lifestyles BMI
 - Weight (in kilograms) divided by height (in meters) squared
 - Proxy for eating habits
- Lifestyles Alcohol consumption
 - How often did the individual drink alcoholic beverages during the three months preceding the interview?
 - From 1 ("Not at all in the last 3 months") to 7 ("Almost every day")

Variables - Objective House Price Shocks

- Objective house price shocks
 - Constructed using the average house price in the region
 - ΔHPI is the percentage change in the regional House Price Index (HPI) between the quarters prior to the quarter of interview at each wave
 - Switzerland: quarterly data are not available; ΔHPI is equal to the percentage change in the regional HPI between the years prior to the two interview dates
 - ▶ Within- and between-country variation in the interview date at each wave
 - PosΔHPI is the percentage change in the HPI, conditional on the change being positive
 - ► Neg △HPI is the percentage change in the HPI, conditional on the change being negative

Variables - Subjective House Price Shocks and Tenure Status

- Subjective house price shocks
 - Defined for homeowners only
 - Question in the SHARE asked to each household about the market value of the property
 - ΔSPrice is the percentage change in the self-assessed market value of the house between the two waves
 - ▶ Pos A SPrice
 - Neg∆SPrice
- ► Tenure Status
 - Dummy for whether the individual is a homeowner
 - Interacted with the house prices shocks variables to explore potentially heterogeneous impacts of house prices depending on the tenure status



Variables - Controls

- ▶ Controls for baseline characteristics measured at wave 2 :
 - Gender
 - Age (in seven categories)
 - Marital status
 - Household size
 - ISCED education levels (in three categories)
 - Retirement status
 - Number of children (the log of the number of children + 1)
- ▶ Controls for changes in characteristics occurring between waves 2 and 4
 - Dummy for whether at least one child left the household
 - Dummy for becoming a widow or divorcing
 - Dummy for retiring

Empirical Strategy

▶ We estimate the following equation :

$$\Delta \textit{Health}_{\textit{irc}} = \alpha + \beta \Delta \textit{HPrice}_j + X^{\textit{B}}_{\textit{irc}} \gamma_1 + \Delta X_{\textit{irc}} \gamma_2 + D_c + \epsilon_{\textit{irc}}$$

- ▶ Individual *i*, in region *r*, and country *c*
- ightharpoonup $\Delta Health_{irc}$ is the change in health
- ▶ $\Delta HPrice_j$ (with j = i, r) represents either a subjective or an objective house price shock
 - ▶ Subjective shocks are measured at the individual level (j = i)
 - ▶ Objective shocks are measured at the regional level (j = r)
- \triangleright X_{irc}^{B} are baseline individual controls (measured at wave 2)
- $ightharpoonup \Delta X_{irc}$ are changes in some individual characteristics (retirement, divorce or widowhood)
- $ightharpoonup D_c$ are country dummies
- ightharpoonup ϵ_{irc} is the error term
- Model estimated using OLS and clustering standard errors by regions
- On the sample of non-movers



Results - Objective and Subjective House Prices

TABLE: Correlation between objective house price variations and self-assessed house market value - Sample: homeowners who did not move between the two waves

Dependent variable : $\Delta SPrice$	(1)	(2)	(3)	
ΔΗΡΙ	0.866***	0.683***	0.682***	
	(0.111)	(0.161)	(0.162)	
Controls Baseline X^B Changes ΔX	NO	YES	YES	
	NO	NO	YES	
N	2640	2594	2594	

	(1 SA		(2) Mental WB	
ΔHPI	0.002	(0.002)	0.004	(0.006)
△HPI * Owner	-0.001	(0.002)	-0.003	(0.003)
Owner	-0.016	(0.042)	0.006	(0.088)
Female	0.032	(0.030)	-0.051	(0.067)
$Age \leq 55$	0.019	(0.055)	-0.068	(0.117)
Age 55-60	0.081	(0.059)	0.208**	(0.104)
Age 65-70	-0.059	(0.053)	-0.204*	(0.118)
Age 70-75	-0.035	(0.051)	-0.308**	(0.152)
Age 75-80	-0.057	(0.055)	-0.317**	(0.144)
Age 80-85	-0.169**	(0.079)	-0.352*	(0.191)
Age >85	-0.289**	(0.114)	-0.647*	(0.341)
Married at wave 2	-0.001	(0.047)	-0.218**	(0.089)
Household size at wave 2	-0.010	(0.022)	0.000	(0.042)
Pre-primary education	-0.023	(0.086)	-0.232	(0.191)
Primary education	0.008	(0.047)	-0.188*	(0.101)
Lower secondary education	0.024	(0.050)	-0.069	(0.098)
Tertiary education	-0.025	(0.050)	-0.203**	(0.085)
Retired at wave 2	-0.002	(0.043)	0.041	(0.104)
Log of number of children at wave 2	-0.000	(0.026)	-0.001	(0.063)
Widowed or divorced between waves 2 and 4	-0.069	(0.102)	-0.899***	(0.251)
Retired between waves 2 and 4	0.011	(0.046)	0.121	(0.098)
Child departure between waves 2 and 4	0.386**	(0.171)	0.867**	(0.383)
% change in unemployment rate	0.002**	(0.001)	-0.001	(0.003)
Country fixed-effects	YES		YES	
N	5710		5483	

	(1)	(2)	(3		(4		(5)
	Less syn	nptoms	Mobi	lity	Less /	ADL	Less I	ADL	Max	grip
ΔΗΡΙ	-0.007	(0.004)	-0.003	(0.005)	-0.002	(0.002)	-0.000	(0.003)	-0.015	(0.017)
ΔHPI * Owner	-0.003	(0.003)	-0.003	(0.003)	-0.001	(0.001)	-0.002	(0.002)	-0.014	(0.017)
Owner	-0.036	(0.068)	-0.004	(0.071)	0.001	(0.032)	0.070	(0.043)	-0.329	(0.282)
Female	-0.011	(0.046)	-0.060	(0.054)	0.025	(0.019)	0.028	(0.024)	-1.176**	(0.519)
Age ≤ 55	0.036	(0.081)	0.072	(0.087)	0.112***	(0.042)	0.093*	(0.050)	-0.850**	(0.414)
Age 55-60	0.093	(0.065)	0.034	(0.081)	0.038	(0.043)	0.041	(0.045)	-0.157	(0.275)
Age 65-70	-0.165**	(0.081)	-0.241***	(0.090)	-0.055*	(0.031)	-0.100***	(0.037)	-0.147	(0.378)
Age 70-75	-0.107	(0.100)	-0.323***	(0.107)	-0.110**	(0.046)	-0.195***	(0.052)	0.102	(0.407)
Age 75-80	-0.140	(0.098)	-0.648***	(0.114)	-0.289***	(0.065)	-0.430***	(0.084)	-0.546	(0.471)
Age 80-85	-0.151	(0.135)	-0.832***	(0.205)	-0.471***	(0.089)	-0.866***	(0.125)	-1.363***	(0.435)
Age >85	-0.289	(0.289)	-1.811***	(0.376)	-1.203***	(0.218)	-1.847***	(0.266)	-1.109	(0.989)
Married at wave 2	0.011	(0.077)	0.083	(0.068)	0.047	(0.030)	0.035	(0.046)	-0.269	(0.254)
Household size at wave 2	0.030	(0.038)	-0.082**	(0.039)	-0.046***	(0.017)	-0.046*	(0.025)	0.067	(0.131)
Pre-primary education	-0.079	(0.134)	-0.041	(0.176)	-0.049	(0.075)	-0.119	(0.097)	0.022	(0.521)
Primary education	-0.075	(0.066)	0.079	(0.066)	0.029	(0.033)	-0.033	(0.042)	-0.339	(0.271)
Lower secondary education	0.027	(0.061)	0.021	(0.071)	0.004	(0.025)	-0.009	(0.031)	-0.809**	(0.374)
Tertiary education	0.024	(0.053)	-0.031	(0.073)	0.004	(0.032)	0.001	(0.028)	-0.133	(0.277)
Retired at wave 2	0.029	(0.081)	0.035	(0.090)	0.082***	(0.030)	0.081	(0.049)	-1.282**	(0.486)
Log of number of children w2	-0.021	(0.057)	0.079	(0.055)	0.033	(0.021)	-0.011	(0.031)	0.006	(0.192)
Widowed or divorced w2-w4	-0.012	(0.123)	-0.008	(0.181)	0.151**	(0.070)	0.117	(0.103)	0.250	(0.773)
Retired w2-w4	0.066	(0.074)	-0.042	(0.079)	0.031	(0.029)	0.021	(0.033)	-0.981**	(0.410)
Child departure w2-w4	0.202	(0.234)	-0.044	(0.356)	-0.012	(0.161)	-0.098	(0.184)	-0.061	(1.505)
% change in unemployment rate	-0.000	(0.002)	-0.005	(0.003)	0.000	(0.001)	-0.001	(0.001)	0.006	(0.009)
Country fixed-effects	YES		YES		YES		YES		YES	
N	5730		5715		5714		5714		5175	

	(1 BM		(2) Alcohol	
Δ HPI	0.003	(0.005)	0.003	(0.004)
∆HPI * Owner	0.002	(0.004)	-0.001	(0.003)
Owner	-0.063	(0.073)	0.009	(0.078)
Female	-0.229**	(0.093)	-0.059	(0.061)
$Age \leq 55$	0.076	(0.119)	-0.039	(0.084)
Age 55-60	0.101	(0.108)	0.001	(0.077)
Age 65-70	-0.021	(0.129)	0.030	(0.095)
Age 70-75	0.013	(0.134)	-0.043	(0.108)
Age 75-80	-0.289**	(0.144)	-0.164	(0.113)
Age 80-85	-0.542***	(0.188)	-0.296*	(0.153)
Age >85	0.348	(0.349)	-0.625***	(0.195)
Married at wave 2	-0.106	(0.080)	0.049	(0.063)
Household size at wave 2	-0.037	(0.052)	0.008	(0.038)
Pre-primary education	-0.185	(0.142)	-0.190	(0.191)
Primary education	-0.072	(0.077)	0.015	(0.077)
Lower secondary education	-0.108	(0.072)	-0.161**	(0.078)
Tertiary education	-0.105*	(0.060)	-0.080	(0.069)
Retired at wave 2	-0.401***	(0.105)	-0.083	(0.068)
Log of number of children at wave 2	0.134**	(0.062)	-0.003	(0.054)
Widowed or divorced between waves 2 and 4	-0.485*	(0.280)	-0.218	(0.214)
Retired between waves 2 and 4	-0.191*	(0.113)	0.010	(0.090)
Child departure between waves 2 and 4	-0.202	(0.284)	-0.107	(0.347)
% change in unemployment rate	-0.003	(0.002)	-0.006***	(0.002)
Country fixed effects	YES		YES	
N	5472		5678	

- Control variables
 - Female
 - Negative effect on (the change in) grip strength and BMI
 - Age
 - Negative correlation with general health, mental well-being, mobility, less ADL and IADI
 - Negative correlation at older ages for alcohol consumption
 - Education
 - Non-linear relationship with mental well-being, (high education) negative correlation with BMI
 - Becoming a widow/divorcing
 - Negative effect on mental well-being and BMI
 - Unemployment rate
 - Negative correlation with alcohol consumption (see work of C. Ruhm)
- Future work : distinction between positive and negative shocks + heterogeneity between countries
 - Specificity of Spain
 - Other countries: positive shocks are associated with an increase in mental well-being
 - Interactions between $\triangle HPI$, owner, and country dummies



- Sample of homeowners
- Same list of controls as before
- Negative correlation with mental health and physical health (less IADL)

	(1)		(:	2)	(3)		
	S	AH	Mental WB		Less Syr	nptoms	
Δ <i>SPrice</i> N	0.000 2610	(0.001)	-0.002* 2552	(0.001)	-0.001 2617	(0.001)	
	Мо	bility	Less	Less ADL		ADL	
Δ <i>SPrice</i> N	0.001 2609	(0.001)	-0.000 2610	(0.000)	-0.001** 2610	(0.000)	
	Ma	xgrip	ВМІ		Alcohol		
Δ <i>SPrice</i> N	0.004 2461	(0.004)	0.001 2548	(0.001)	0.000 2609	(0.001)	

	(1)		(2))	(3)	
	S	АН	Mental WB		Less syn	nptoms
$\Delta Sprice$ $\Delta SPrice$ * Netherlands $\Delta SPrice$ * Spain $\Delta SPrice$ * France $\Delta SPrice$ * Switzerland N	0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 2610	(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)	0.001 -0.007** -0.003 -0.004 -0.004** 2552	(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)	0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 2617	(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
	Mobility		Less ADL		Less IADL	
$\Delta Sprice$ $\Delta SPrice$ * Netherlands $\Delta SPrice$ * Spain $\Delta SPrice$ * France $\Delta SPrice$ * Switzerland N	0.001 -0.003 -0.000 0.002 0.001 2609	(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)	0.001 -0.001 -0.003*** -0.001 -0.001 2610	(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)	-0.000 -0.002* -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 2610	(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
	Ma	xgrip	BM	ВМІ		hol
$\Delta Sprice$ $\Delta SPrice$ * Netherlands $\Delta SPrice$ * Spain $\Delta SPrice$ * France $\Delta SPrice$ * Switzerland N	0.003 0.005 -0.008 0.015 0.013 2461	(0.006) (0.012) (0.009) (0.015) (0.009)	0.002 -0.004 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 2548	(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)	0.002** -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003** 2609	(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)

Conclusion

- Different impacts of objective and subjective shocks
 - No impact of objective shocks on health
 - No difference between owners and tenants
 - When excluding Spain, positive impact of objective shocks on mental health (still no difference between owners and tenants)
 - Small but significant negative impact of subjective shocks on mental well-being and physical health (IADL)
- ▶ Preliminary results/work in progress
 - ► Focus on the sample of individuals who do not move. Since residential mobility is correlated with wealth (Angelini & Laferrère, 2012): sample selection?
 - Are the effects of positive and negative shocks non symmetric?
 - Why a Spain effect?
 - ► Heterogeneous impacts (interactions with gender, age)?

